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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the structural consequences of the post-1980 out-
ward-orientation on the market concentration and accumulation patterns in the Turkish
manufacturing industries. Using various panel data procedures over twenty-nine subsectors
of Turkish manufacturing for the 1980–1996 period, we focus on three sets of issues: (1) the
effect of openness on the extent of market concentration as measured in CR4 ratios; (2) the
behavior of gross profit margins (markups) in relation to openness, concentration ratios,
and real wage costs; and (3) the behavior of sectoral real investments (by destination) in
relation to the profit margins, real wage costs, and the openness indicator.
Our results suggest very little structural change in the sectoral composition and nature
of market concentration and behavior of profit margins under the post-1980 structural
adjustment reforms and outward-orientation. We find that, contrary to expectations, “open-
ness” had very little impact, if any, on profit margins (markups), and, within manufactur-
ing, the trade-adjusting sectors reveal a positive relationship between the profit margins
and openness. Profit margins are found to be positively and significantly related to concen-
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tration power and real wage cost increases. Real investments in the sector display a posi-
tive relationship with profit margins and real wages yet bear a statistically insignificant
relationship vis-à-vis openness.
Key words: market concentration, markup, openness, Turkish manufacturing.
In this paper, we investigate the structural consequences of the post-1980 out-
ward-orientation on the market concentration and accumulation patterns in the
Turkish manufacturing industries. The period under analysis is known to span the
overall transformation of the Turkish economy from domestic demand-oriented
import-substitutionist industrialization to one with export-orientation and integra-
tion with the global commodity and financial markets. During this period, the
manufacturing industry has evolved as the main sector in both leading the export-
orientation of the economy and as a focal sector wherein the distribution patterns
between wage-labor and capital have been reshaped.
Existing independent studies1 and rudimentary data from official agencies sug-
gest both formal and anecdotal evidence that one of the major structural deficien-
cies of the sector reveals itself in the rather loose association between the gains in
export penetration and labor productivity, on one hand, and the dismal patterns of
employment, accumulation, and of remunerations of wage labor, on the other.
This deformation is, in fact, observed to be a perennial feature of the post-1980
structural adjustment era. In their analysis of the decomposition of labor produc-
tivity in manufacturing, for instance, Voyvoda and Yeldan (1999) report that, since
the inception of the structural adjustment reforms and outward-orientation, the
underlying sources of productivity gains were not significantly altered in the sec-
tor. They found that none of the leading export sectors of the 1980s could have
generated sufficiently strong productivity contributions, nor admitted strong inter-
industry linkages to serve as the leading sectors propelling the rest of the economy.
Given this background, there exists further considerable evidence on the extent
of monopolization and high concentration in the Turkish manufacturing indus-
tries. The State Institute of Statistics (SIS) data suggest, for instance, that the pro-
cess of export orientation and overall trade liberalization since 1980 has not affected
the structural characteristics of the manufacturing industry. Many of the monopo-
listically competitive sectors either kept their existing high rates of concentration,
or even suffered from increased monopolization as measured by their CR4 ratios
or Herfindahl indices. Even among many competitive sectors of 1980, one ob-
serves increases in the CR4 ratios by 1996.2
These observations suggest that, contrary to expectations, the opening process
was unable to introduce warranted increases in competition in the industrial com-
modity markets. In this paper, we attempt to formalize on these observations and
deduce econometric hypotheses on the patterns of trade liberalization, concentra-
tion, and profitability. To this end, we estimate our empirical questions using various
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panel data procedures. We focus on three sets of issues: (1) effect of openness on the
extent of market concentration as measured in CR4 rates; (2) the behavior of gross
profit margins (markups) in relation to openness, concentration rates, and real wage
costs; and (3) the behavior of sectoral real investments (by destination) in relation to
the markups, real wage costs, and the openness indicator.
Tackling on a similar set of issues as ours, Yalçén (2000) performed a two-stage
least square estimation of price–cost margins (markups) using panel data of the
ISIC four-digit level of Turkish manufacturing industries over the 1983–1994 pe-
riod. Yalçén’s analysis is directly focused on the “import-discipline hypothesis”—
whether the import penetration, due to foreign trade liberalization of the 1980s,
was sufficient to remove the excess profits of the oligopolistic domestic firms,
enhancing a relatively competitive market behavior. Utilizing panel data analyses
for the public versus private sectors separately, Yalçén (2000) found that even though
there had been an overall decrease in the profit margins in the entire private sector,
profit margins in the highly concentrated subsectors of private manufacturing did
in fact increase along with import penetration. In contrast, using private manufac-
turing data over the 1977–1985 period, Forouton (1991) reported that import pen-
etration in the concentrated sectors led to a reduction in the gross profit margins.
Similarly, Engin et al. (1995) note that, despite the nominal expectations of com-
petitive pressures on the markups via the discipline of import penetration, they
found no statistically significant relationship between import penetration and profit
margins in the private sector.
As such, the existing literature on the Turkish manufacturing industry fails to
provide an unambiguous indication of increased competitiveness and falling profit
margins, despite expectations of pressures of global commodity markets. Thus, an
exclusive purpose of this paper is to provide a formal assessment of these issues.
Phases of Macroeconomic Adjustment in Turkish Manufacturing
Table 1 summarizes the main indicators of the manufacturing industry under the
post-1980 adjustments. To document the extent of the oligopolistic structure of the
sector, we tabulate the rate of market concentration in the manufacturing industry
subsectors as calculated by the shares of the four largest enterprises in the total
sales (revenues) of the sector (hence, the acronym CR4). Accordingly, we classify
those sectors with CR4 ratios above 30 percent to be imperfectly competitive, and
those having CR4 ratios below this threshold as competitive.3 Data on other sectoral
variables comes from the SIS Manufacturing Industry Annual Surveys. To arrive
at “wage rates” and the “average labor product,” we have used data on “total wages
paid” and “value added” divided, respectively, by “average number of workers
engaged.” We have used the sectoral wholesale producer prices in deflating nomi-
nal magnitudes.
The periodization of Table 1 follows the adjustment path of the overall economy.



















Phases of Macroeconomic Adjustment in Turkish Manufacturing, 1980–1997
1980
Growth in
Foreign trade Share of public Share of labor Growth in real average Gross profit
Concentration ratio to value sector in value costs in value real wages product of margins
Sectors ratios (CR4) added added added (%) labor (%) (markup)
Competitive sectors (as of 1980)
311 10.2 0.38 0.33 0.33 5.50 41.57 0.21
312 22.1 0.57 0.50 0.43 1.91 40.92 0.17
321 12.7 0.29 0.14 0.34 17.99 13.11 0.31
322 21.3 2.18 0.02 0.36 –10.84 44.56 0.21
323 21.6 0.03 0.00 0.46 3.28 60.87 0.14
331 19.9 0.08 0.37 0.37 3.63 –7.40 0.29
352 21.2 0.29 0.05 0.28 0.49 43.18 0.27
356 25.4 0.02 0.01 0.27 8.71 –4.39 0.28
369 17.0 0.19 0.20 0.28 –2.61 47.85 0.44
381 16.3 0.72 0.07 0.30 13.85 8.34 0.40
383 15.0 0.60 0.29 0.32 –8.37 13.63 0.36

































Foreign trade Share of public Share of labor Growth in real average Gross profit
Concentration ratio to value sector in value costs in value real wages product of margins
Sectors ratios (CR4) added added added (%) labor (%) (markup)
Imperfectly competitive and oligopolistic sectors (as of 1980)
313 55.8 0.02 0.65 0.18 1.77 37.51 1.17
314 46.4 0.00 0.92 0.50 19.24 58.96 0.28
324 63.1 0.01 0.53 0.47 26.92 19.53 0.19
332 37.5 0.13 0.00 0.31 24.65 109.13 0.31
341 47.4 0.34 0.47 0.52 – 15.06 – 0.57 0.19
342 36.5 0.05 0.19 0.52 – 0.68 89.56 0.19
351 49.2 1.78 0.54 0.21 – 2.24 – 10.13 0.47
353 100.0 0.71 1.00 0.04 – 12.79 180.20 0.37
354 54.7 0.03 0.08 0.11 2.91 – 4.65 0.53
355 71.5 0.14 0.00 0.26 – 0.84 8.92 0.40
361 79.6 0.03 0.17 0.36 1.94 – 7.68 0.72
362 72.1 0.26 0.00 0.31 40.16 34.15 0.68
371 54.8 0.47 0.67 0.46 6.48 18.68 0.22
372 47.2 0.35 0.51 0.37 2.18 – 17.95 0.30
382 33.4 1.37 0.22 0.42 9.69 25.45 0.25
384 35.8 0.70 0.32 0.51 – 16.89 22.31 0.21
385 32.2 11.05 0.00 0.28 80.61 29.13 0.42
390 42.3 0.54 0.00 0.31 – 7.41 – 0.76 0.45





















Foreign trade Share of public Share of labor Growth in real average Gross profit
Concentration ratio to value sector in value costs in value real wages product of margins
Sectors ratios (CR4) added added added (%) labor (%) (markup)
Competitive sectors (as of 1980)
311 11.6 0.92 0.29 0.23 – 3.721 6.74 0.21
312 23.3 0.47 0.43 0.23 – 4.469 10.85 0.17
321 9.2 0.81 0.12 0.26 – 0.804 7.62 0.32
322 19.2 4.63 0.01 0.20 – 0.616 11.10 0.27
323 18.3 0.70 0.00 0.22 – 3.921 8.63 0.22
331 17.1 0.97 0.39 0.24 – 4.366 6.66 0.24
352 22.6 0.52 0.04 0.18 0.75 11.48 0.38
356 21.0 0.25 0.00 0.21 – 1.55 6.92 0.24
369 18.5 0.43 0.22 0.19 – 0.47 5.67 0.49
381 14.9 2.66 0.08 0.23 – 0.80 7.91 0.37
383 24.9 1.23 0.07 0.19 – 1.91 8.88 0.42


































Foreign trade Share of public Share of labor Growth in real average Gross profit
Concentration ratio to value sector in value costs in value real wages product of margins
Sectors ratios (CR4) added added added (%) labor (%) (markup)
Imperfectly competitive and oligopolistic sectors (as of 1980)
313 45.4 0.04 0.61 0.10 – 5.27 9.02 1.35
314 64.9 0.08 0.91 0.11 – 7.42 22.61 1.26
324 49.3 0.32 0.40 0.43 – 5.65 45.41 0.18
332 47.4 0.64 0.19 0.20 3.49 16.00 0.43
341 37.0 0.64 0.47 0.23 – 7.52 9.83 0.28
342 38.4 0.14 0.09 0.25 – 1.13 13.94 0.41
351 41.0 2.84 0.40 0.12 – 3.87 12.62 0.35
353 99.2 0.29 0.86 0.01 – 6.30 16.16 0.66
354 68.9 0.18 0.11 0.06 – 3.17 3.03 0.31
355 70.7 0.42 0.00 0.19 – 2.15 7.06 0.38
361 62.0 0.14 0.14 0.16 – 3.10 12.23 0.83
362 61.0 0.56 0.00 0.21 2.65 13.84 0.61
371 43.5 1.50 0.52 0.22 – 4.90 12.49 0.23
372 49.0 1.19 0.35 0.23 – 4.52 8.97 0.24
382 38.0 3.03 0.19 0.27 – 2.65 9.44 0.29
384 35.7 1.17 0.12 0.26 – 4.35 10.25 0.32
385 34.7 18.45 0.16 0.30 8.87 12.50 0.37
390 37.9 1.22 0.00 0.26 – 1.53 2.57 0.40





















Foreign trade Share of public Share of labor Growth in real average Gross profit
Concentration ratio to value sector in value costs in value real wages product of margins
Sectors ratios (CR4) added added added (%) labor (%) (markup)
Competitive sectors (as of 1980)
311 13.0 0.62 0.31 0.23 16.02 15.78 0.29
312 18.7 0.51 0.32 0.37 20.31 5.35 0.16
321 8.5 0.94 0.07 0.28 7.37 7.10 0.35
322 5.6 2.40 0.02 0.20 3.83 7.07 0.30
323 27.0 2.24 0.00 0.22 2.38 7.30 0.28
331 20.5 0.38 0.28 0.32 16.20 10.95 0.24
352 22.7 0.52 0.03 0.18 12.68 15.74 0.55
356 20.4 0.30 0.02 0.21 8.10 10.86 0.33
369 19.5 0.30 0.15 0.20 11.49 13.93 0.65
381 18.8 0.80 0.05 0.24 8.37 8.54 0.44
383 29.7 1.25 0.01 0.23 13.29 12.64 0.46


































Foreign trade Share of public Share of labor Growth in real average Gross profit
Concentration ratio to value sector in value costs in value real wages product of margins
Sectors ratios (CR4) added added added (%) labor (%) (markup)
Imperfectly competitive and oligopolistic sectors (as of 1980)
313 33.0 0.40 0.51 0.12 18.43 10.50 1.08
314 59.6 0.22 0.84 0.20 25.05 2.31 0.75
324 37.1 0.52 0.29 0.39 6.14 11.44 0.25
332 44.9 0.38 0.00 0.22 9.92 6.48 0.43
341 25.6 0.81 0.32 0.35 17.69 5.90 0.31
342 50.1 0.12 0.09 0.17 6.67 22.19 0.52
351 49.9 2.31 0.38 0.25 15.67 – 5.96 0.39
353 98.1 0.17 1.00 0.02 24.42 9.21 1.12
354 74.6 0.21 0.08 0.16 14.17 4.64 0.20
355 71.5 0.55 0.01 0.25 15.83 9.99 0.58
361 58.8 0.13 0.07 0.19 15.73 13.18 1.06
362 51.9 0.49 0.02 0.29 15.81 11.56 0.60
371 35.7 1.55 0.39 0.38 18.26 5.59 0.19
372 46.8 1.08 0.30 0.35 17.66 3.08 0.28
382 44.8 2.49 0.09 0.26 11.37 11.39 0.39
384 47.8 0.89 0.07 0.26 14.56 16.16 0.34
385 45.1 6.25 0.11 0.24 8.60 18.60 0.51
390 29.3 1.83 0.06 0.27 5.74 9.16 0.48


















Financial crisis and reinvigoration of foreign capital-led growth
1994– 1996
Growth in
Foreign trade Share of public Share of labor Growth in real average Gross profit
Concentration ratio to value sector in value costs in value real wages product of margins
Sectors ratios (CR4) added added added (%) labor (%) (markup)
Competitive sectors (as of 1980)
311 14.4 1.20 0.13 0.19 – 9.57 – 6.22 0.31
312 18.2 1.18 0.13 0.23 – 9.55 6.70 0.20
321 7.5 1.76 0.03 0.22 – 9.52 – 2.42 0.36
322 6.0 1.86 0.02 0.20 – 1.58 – 1.60 0.31
323 24.1 2.72 0.05 0.20 – 2.50 4.36 0.26
331 30.6 0.80 0.11 0.22 – 14.41 – 3.49 0.28
352 20.4 0.90 0.02 0.15 – 6.53 – 1.87 0.66
356 20.0 0.93 0.04 0.16 – 3.46 – 0.43 0.38
369 19.5 0.39 0.04 0.15 – 9.92 – 3.33 0.72
381 16.7 1.22 0.05 0.19 – 6.28 – 0.27 0.43
383 24.4 1.95 0.02 0.20 – 8.93 – 6.08 0.52































Financial crisis and reinvigoration of foreign capital-led growth
1994– 1996
Growth in
Foreign trade Share of public Share of labor Growth in real average Gross profit
Concentration ratio to value sector in value costs in value real wages product of margins
Sectors ratios (CR4) added added added (%) labor (%) (markup)
Imperfectly competitive and oligopolistic sectors (as of 1980)
313 34.6 0.11 0.35 0.10 – 10.27 – 6.43 0.76
314 64.5 0.90 0.45 0.23 – 9.32 – 14.05 0.44
324 36.5 1.72 0.18 0.27 – 9.41 1.19 0.35
332 40.6 0.72 0.00 0.17 – 11.16 – 0.88 0.52
341 22.6 1.46 0.19 0.24 – 9.04 – 3.09 0.40
342 60.0 0.19 0.07 0.14 – 3.08 – 2.19 0.44
351 57.4 3.02 0.48 0.16 – 6.66 7.14 0.55
353 98.3 0.24 1.00 0.01 – 9.65 6.32 1.09


















355 74.8 0.85 0.01 0.20 – 7.40 2.18 0.63
361 59.4 0.29 0.05 0.17 – 9.02 – 7.27 1.04
362 56.9 0.71 0.00 0.25 – 4.66 – 4.49 0.69
371 31.5 1.75 0.38 0.19 – 10.74 9.79 0.32
372 45.4 2.46 0.38 0.23 – 10.31 1.42 0.30
382 42.2 4.10 0.07 0.20 – 6.97 0.92 0.45
384 41.0 1.91 0.05 0.20 – 8.29 – 0.69 0.38
385 56.8 5.58 0.05 0.16 – 10.11 1.11 0.59
390 29.2 3.71 0.06 0.18 – 6.55 6.87 0.57
Average — 1.59 0.42 0.14 – 8.28 3.24 0.53
Note: The data cover twenty-nine subsectors of Turkish manufacturing for the period 1980–1996.
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three distinct cycles of growth crisis and adjustment: The first broadly covers the
1980–1989 period, with its main attribute being the increased export-orientation
of the economy. Following the foreign exchange crisis of 1977–1980, growth was
reinvigorated following the introduction of a structural adjustment program in
January 1980, under the auspices of international centers such as the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 1981–1987 period was marked
with commodity trade liberalization and export promotion, along with a price re-
form aimed at reducing the state’s role in economic affairs. The existing system of
fixed exchange rate administration was replaced by a flexible regime of crawling-
peg, and, together with the introduction of a complex system of direct export sub-
sidization, acted as the main instruments for the promotion of exports and pursuit
of macroeconomic stability.4
During the 1983–1987 period, export revenues increased at an annual rate of
10.8 percent, and the gross domestic product (GDP) rose at an annual rate of 6.5
percent. The period was also characterized by a severe erosion of wage incomes
via hostile measures against organized labor. The suppression of wages was in-
strumental both in lowering production costs and in squeezing the domestic ab-
sorption capacity. The share of wage-labor in manufacturing value added receded
from its average of 35.6 percent in 1977–1980 to 20.6 percent in 1988. In this
process, the average markup rate (profit margins) in private manufacturing in-
creased from 31 percent to 38 percent.
During the 1980s, the composition of total fixed investments displayed quite
adverse trends at the sectoral level from the point of view of strategic targets. In
fact, as gross fixed investments of the private sector increased by 14.1 percent
during the 1983–1987 period, only a small portion of this amount was directed to
manufacturing. The rate of growth of private manufacturing investments has been
on the order of one-half of this figure, at a rate of only 7.7 percent per annum, and
could not reach its pre-1980 levels in real terms until the end of 1989. Much of the
expansion in private manufacturing investments originated from the pull from
housing investments, which expanded by an annual average of 24.5 percent dur-
ing the 1983–1987 period. This resulted in a significant anomaly as far as the
official stance toward industrialization was concerned: in a period where outward
orientation was supposedly directed to increased manufacturing exports through
significant price and subsidy incentives, distribution of investments revealed a
declining trend for the sector. The implications of this nonconformity between the
stated foreign trade objectives toward manufacturing exports and the realized pat-
terns of accumulation away from manufacturing constituted one of the main struc-
tural deficiencies of the export-oriented growth strategy of the 1980s and, according
to our view, played a crucial role in the failure of maintaining the export promo-
tion program as a sustainable strategy of development.
As this unbalanced structure failed to generate the necessary accumulation pat-
terns, the artificial growth path generated by way of wage suppression and price
subsidies was observed to reach its economic and political limits by 1988. Starting
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in 1988, we observe real wage earnings to enter a period of recovery following the
gains of union movement, and also of the new wave of populist pressures. As can
be observed from data in Table 1, all subsectors of manufacturing experienced
significant rises in wage remunerations. On average, real wages in manufacturing
increased at an annual rate of 10.2 percent from 1989 to 1993. In retrospect, it can
be argued that the post-1988 populism could evidently be financed by expanding
the tax base over the “unrecorded private commercial transactions,” and by mov-
ing toward a “fair” tax system. Yet, the strategic preference of the government was
the maintenance of its current stance toward erosion of taxable capital incomes
and absorption of all costs of adjustment in favor of profit incomes against the
culminating wage pressures (Boratav et al. 2000; Cizre-Sakalléog¬lu and Yeldan
2000; Türel 1999). As one of the major indicators of the (functional) distribution
of income, we observe that the profit margins, in fact, followed a rising trend, and
reached 47 percent in 1994, from its average of 33.5 percent in 1989. See Figure 1
for the portrayal of markups and real wage costs over the 1980–1996 time period.
Given these broad shifts in the macroeconomic environment, the 1989 policy
maneuver of capital account liberalization served as one of the major policy initia-
tives to a new round of growth. This policy maneuver paved the way for injection
of liquidity to the domestic economy in terms of short-term foreign capital (flows
of “hot money”). Such inflows enabled, on one hand, financing of the accelerated
public sector expenditures, and also provided relief of the increased pressures of
aggregate demand on the domestic markets by way of cheapening costs of im-
ports.5 Consequently, the bonanza of cheap, imported intermediates fueled the sec-
ond wave of the growth cycle between 1989 and 1993.
Erratic movements in the current account, a rising trade deficit (from 3.5 per-
cent of gross national product [GNP] during the 1985–1988 period to 6 percent
during the 1990–1993 period) and a drastic deterioration of fiscal balances dis-
close the unsustainable character of the post-1989 populism financed by foreign
capital inflows. This prolonged instability reached its climax during the fourth quarter
of 1993, when the currency appreciation and the consequent current account defi-
cits rose to unprecedented levels. With the sudden drainage of short-term funds in
the beginning of January 1994, imports dwindled by 15 percent, GDP fell by 5.5
percent, and the inflation rate soared to 106 percent. Together with this contraction,
the post-1994 crisis management gave rise to significant shifts in income distribu-
tion, and real wages in manufacturing declined by 36.3 percent. Likewise, dollar-
denominated wage costs decreased substantially and enabled export earnings to
rise. In this manner, Turkey has once again switched back to its classic mode of
surplus extraction, whereby export performance of industrial sectors depend on
savings on wage costs. In fact, the disequilibrium could have only been accommo-
dated by the massive (downward) flexibility displayed by real remunerations of
wage-labor. Thus, the post-1995 period witnessed the reinvigoration of foreign
capital-led growth—the third cycle. Finally, the global deceleration following the
contagion of the Asian financial crisis hit the Turkish economy starting in August
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1998 under the already adverse conditions of severe macroeconomic disequilibria
with accelerating fiscal and current account deficits, high inflation and unemploy-
ment, and increased social unrest.
Clearly, the inherent characteristics of the growth-crisis–adjustment cycles iden-
tified thus far have had quite different macroeconomic dynamics in operation. The
export-orientation phase (1980–1988) was driven by commodity trade liberaliza-
tion and real depreciation under conditions of wage suppression. The post-1989
financial liberalization completed the integration of the domestic economy with
the global commodity and financial markets, and initiated a process of short-term
foreign capital-led growth with abrupt mini cycles of boom and crisis throughout
the 1990s. Whereas the former cycle relied on domestic surplus creation via squeez-
ing wage incomes, the latter mostly relied on foreign finance under conditions of
high wages.
We follow the microeconomic swings across the individual subsectors within
manufacturing from Table 1. Given our criterion of distinguishing individual sec-
tors as competitive versus imperfectly competitive based on their CR4 ratios, we
observe that eighteen of the twenty-nine sectors fall under the “imperfectly com-
petitive and oligopolistic” group in 1980. Eight of them have CR4 ratios higher
than 50 percent. By 1996 there is very little change in these subgroups. As of
1996, the share of value added of the imperfectly competitive sectors in manufac-
turing total reached 51 percent. Furthermore, these sectors employ 31 percent of
total manufacturing employment in our database. In contrast, the output share of
the imperfectly competitive sectors was 55 percent, and their employment share
was 42 percent in 1980.
Figure 1. Profit Margins (Markup Rates) and Real Wage Costs in Turkish Private
Manufacturing
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Leaving sector 353 (petroleum refineries) aside due to its exclusive public own-
ership, as of the 1994–1996 average, the highest degree of concentration is ob-
served in:
Rubber and plastics (355)—74.8 percent
Tobacco manufactures (314)—64.5 percent
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal (354)—63.4 percent
Printing and publishing (342)—60.0 percent
It is interesting to note that the size of the public sector is not necessarily the main
actor in these sectors, with public share being 0.01 in 355; 0.04 in 354; and 0.07 in
342. Sectors 321 (textiles) and 322 (wearing apparel) display the most competi-
tive environment with respect to their CR4 ratios.
Overall, one witnesses a mixed pattern of concentration from 1980 to 1996. In
general, there is very little structural shift across the two subgroups. We record
341 (paper and paper products) to be the only sector to change its imperfectly
competitive status from a CR4 of 47.1 percent in 1980 to 22.6 percent in 1996. Per
contra, it is interesting to note that one also witnesses a competitive sector such as
manufacture of wood products (331) to increase its concentration level beyond the
imperfectly competitive threshold of 30 percent by 1996.
At the expense of over-generalization, we can nevertheless confer a tendency
for higher markup rates within the imperfectly competitive block. Petroleum re-
fineries (353), soil products (361), and nonmetals (369) have the highest markup
rates over 1994–1996 with 1.07, 1.04, and 0.72, respectively. On the other hand,
sectors 312, 323, and 324 yield the lowest markups. We further observe that growth
in real wages has been consistently negative over the 1981–1988 and 1994–1997
periods, whereas real wage costs have been on an upward trend under the financial
deregulation of 1989–1993. As of 1994–1997, the highest share of labor costs in
value added is recorded in manufacture of footwear (324), with 0.27. This is fol-
lowed by glass products (362), with 0.25, and paper and paper products (341),
with 0.24. The disassociation between the real wage movements and labor pro-
ductivity is clearly visible over the classic export-led manufacturing era—1981–
1988. Even though real wages seemed to have caught up with real average labor
products during the 1989–1993 period, this pattern is observed to fall short of its
momentum and, by 1994–1997, real wages start to follow a contractionary trend.
Econometric Investigation
We now turn to the econometric investigation of the dynamics of the Turkish manu-
facturing industry over the post-1980 era. To this end, we focus on the twenty-nine
subsectors of manufacturing based on ISIC three-digit classification. (The ISIC
codes and their sectoral identification are shown in the Appendix.)
We utilize two specifications: we first study the distributional issues and analyze
the behavior of gross profit margins (markup rates) in relation to trade liberalization,
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sectoral concentration, and swings in real wage costs. Second, we analyze the pat-
terns of accumulation and study the behavior of sectoral investment (by destination)
against the behavior of markup rates, real wage costs, and openness.
We continue to rely on our initial classification based on their CR4 ratios. Ac-
cordingly, we classify those sectors that have a CR4 in excess of 0.30 as “imper-
fectly competitive/oligopolistic,” and those with a CR4 less than 0.30 as “perfectly
competitive.” On a different spectrum, sectors are to be regarded as “open,” pro-
vided that their trade volume (measured as imports plus exports) as a ratio of
sectoral value added exceeds 0.50. Per contra, sectors with trade volume-to-value-
added ratios less than 0.50 are regarded as “inward-looking.” We carry this classi-
fication based on the characteristics of the twenty-nine sectors in 1980. We thus
obtain the classifications shown in Table 2 (see the Appendix for identification of
the ISIC codes).
Data Sources
Our data come from the SIS Manufacturing Industry Annual Surveys and Indica-
tors of Concentration. The survey covers all public sector establishments and those
private enterprises employing more than ten workers.
Various concentration measures were available in addition to the CR4 ratio,
such as the CR10 and the Herfindahl indices in our data. We chose to adhere to the
CR4 as the relevant measure of concentration due to its simplicity and also popu-
larity.6 Wage costs include all payments in the form of wages and salaries and per
diems, gross income tax, social security, and pension fund premiums. It also in-
cludes social security, pension, contributions, and the like, payable by the em-
ployer, and overtime payments, bonuses, indemnities, and payments in kind. Annual
wages and salaries paid are compiled for production workers and other staff. Profit
margins (markup rates) are defined as the ratio of total profits to total costs of
wages and intermediate inputs. In the absence of reliable capital stock estimates,
this variable provides a good proxy on the profitability of capital. Finally, sectoral
investments are given by the annual gross fixed additions to capital stock.7
Method of Econometric Estimation
Our essential estimating equations are
MRit = f(αi, Oit, CR4it, RWit) (1)
RIit = f(αi, MRit, Oit, RWit). (2)
The first implicit function represents the trade orientation and distributional
aspects of the manufacturing industry, where MRit denotes markup rates, CR4it
denotes concentration ratios, Oit stands for “openness” of each sector (ratio of
imports plus exports to sectoral value added), and RWit denotes real wage costs.
The second relationship tries to explain the process of capital accumulation using
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three possible determinants, namely markups, real wage costs, and the openness,
where RIit is the real investment of each manufacturing industry sector. The index
{i = 1,2,...,N} refers to the individual unit, and {t = 1,2,...,T} refers to a given time
period. The coefficients αi (sector-specific composite term) have two components:
αi1, a sector-specific intercept; and αi2t, a sector-specific deterministic growth trend.
Each equation is estimated using a panel data estimator, so that variation over
both the cross-section and time-series dimensions are jointly considered. The ad-
vantages of using panel data estimation are varied. First, panel data enable major
steps to overcome the problems associated with the lack of sufficient historical
data for efficient estimation using a single-sector time-series analysis. Second, it
mostly compensates for the dissatisfaction with using a cross-section estimation.
Since temporal variation is ignored in cross-section estimation, changes occurred
in policy in the specific sectors of the manufacturing industries over the years
cannot be observed. In contrast, panel data estimation uses all the information
available in the time-series and the cross-section–based procedures.
Panel data estimation considers the sector-specific differences. Observed static
differences between sectors of the manufacturing industries can be taken into con-
sideration in variation in the intercept terms, αis. The intercept is allowed to vary
only across individual sectors, not over the time period under consideration. Note
that, as the intercept-shifting dummy variables have been included, time-invariant
regressors cannot simultaneously be introduced, as this would induce multi-
collinearity. There would be two types of specifications. The first one allows only
one intercept coefficient and one slope coefficient on each regressor using a simple
pooled regression. The second one permits the intercept to vary across sectors and
the estimation technique assumes constant slope coefficients across sectors. This
is less restrictive than the former.
The general form of our specifications is assumed to be linear.
For trade orientation and distribution:
MRit = αi + β1 Oit + β2 CR4it + β3 RWit. (1′ )
Table 2
Classification of Sectors: Turkey, 1980
Inward-looking
Open sectors sectors
Competitive sectors 312, 322, 381, 383 311, 321, 323, 331,
352, 356, 369
Imperfectly competitive 351, 353, 382, 384, 313, 314, 324, 332,
sectors 375, 390 341, 342, 354, 355,
361, 362, 371, 372
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For accumulation:
RIit = αi + β1 MRit + β2 Oit + β3 RWit. (2′ )
Two special cases of these general forms arise, depending upon whether the
sector-specific effects (αi) have a fixed component, which is called the “fixed-
effects model” (FEM), or a random component, which is called the “random-
effects model” (REM). The choice of the model can be based on a priori
assumptions. A priori, in the sense that we are dealing with individual sectors, and
random selections from a population would support the adoption of the FEM,
where inferences are restricted to the effects within the sample. However, not sat-
isfied with looking only at a priori assumptions, we test the appropriateness of the
FEM against the REM using the F-test and the Hausman chi-squared test (Hausman
1979; Hausman and Taylor 1981). The Hausman statistic tests for the correlation
between the sector-specific effects and explanatory variables. If they are corre-
lated, the fixed-effect estimator (the within, or the least squares dummy variable
estimator) is consistent, whereas the random effects estimator (the feasible gener-
alized least squares [GLS] estimator) is biased. The within estimator makes use of
the variation of variables within each individual. The feasible GLS estimator is a
weighted average of the within and between estimators, which utilizes variation
between individuals (see Hasio 1990 and Judge et al. 1985). Rejection of the null
of no correlation would lead to the adoption of the fixed-effect estimator using
specifications (1′ ) and (2′ ).8
Analysis of Econometric Results
We employ panel data estimation on specification (1′ ) in six sets of equations.
First, we estimate Equation (1′ ) for the whole sample; in other words, for i =
{1,2,...,29} and t = {1980,1981,...,1996}. Then, we take each of the identified
cells as one individual group exclusively and redo the estimation. Finally, we dis-
tinguish those sectors that were “inward-oriented” in 1980, but became “open” by
1996. That is, sectors i ∈ {2 and 4} in 1980 and i ∈ {1 and 3} in 1996. This leaves
us with the following sectors: {311, 314, 321, 323, 324, 331, 332, 341, 352, 355,
356, 362, 371, 372}. We classify this group with the identifier “trade adjusters.”
Distributional Indicators: Behavior of Gross Profit Margins
We start our econometric investigation with the analysis of the behavior of gross
profit margins (markups). Our bird’s-eye-view observations on the markups, as
portrayed in Figure 1, reflect a general rise of the average profit margins despite
the increased openness and the secular rise of wage costs after 1989.
To test these hypotheses, we regress markup rates on openness, concentration
(CR4 ratios), and logarithm of real wage costs using the panel data. The results are



















Relationship Between Markup Rates, Openness, Concentration Ratio, and Real Wage Costs
Concentration Real
level wage Adjusted
Openness (CR4) costs R2 F-statistic DW test
Overall effect – 0.004* 0.181* 0.111* 0.803 1016.4* 1.23
Open and competitive – 0.002 – 0.055 0.130* 0.877 242.06* 1.28
Open and imperfectly
  competitive – 0.003* 0.301* 0.155* 0.654 99.5* 1.56
Inward looking and
  competitive 0.017* 0.302* 0.183* 0.828 288.13* 1.27
Inward looking and
  imperfectly competitive 0.039* – 0.058 – 0.104* 0.568 140.66* 1.26
  Trade adjusting 0.026* 0.091 0.076* 0.781 431.79* 1.39
Note: * is statistically significant at 1 percent.
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Table 4
Relationship Between Markup Rates, Openness, Concentration Ratio, and
Real Wage Costs (FEM with cross-section specific effects)
Concentration
Cross-section level Real wage
effects Openness (CR4) costs
311 – 0.037* 2.548* 0.099*
312 – 0.014 – 0.934* – 0.134*
313 – 2.457* – 0.383 – 1.167*
314 – 0.050 3.327 – 1.331
321 0.014** – 0.829* 0.064*
322 0.002 – 0.074* 0.219*
323 0.018* 0.305* – 0.021
324 0.035 – 0.437* – 0.130
331 – 0.016 0.927* – 0.276*
332 0.063 1.079 0.015
341 – 0.026 – 1.033* – 0.217*
342 – 0.999 0.230 – 0.486*
351 – 0.040* 1.520* – 0.196*
352 0.256* 0.649 0.691*
353 – 1.399* 7.777 0.838*
354 – 0.906 – 0.136 – 0.353
355 – 0.041 0.689* 0.489*
356 0.097* 1.708* 0.227*
361 – 1.511 – 3.002 – 0.268
362 – 0.291 – 0.444 0.068
369 – 0.572* 2.798* 0.387*
371 – 0.133* – 1.524* – 0.346*
372 0.032 0.702 0.014
381 0.004 1.835* – 0.028
382 0.004 0.733* 0.157*
383 0.031* 0.130 0.167*
384 0.042* 0.333* 0.056*
385 – 0.005* 0.339* 0.067




Notes: * is statistically significant at 1 percent; ** is statistically significant at 5 percent.
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Our econometric results reveal the following relationship for the markup equa-
tion when all sectors are considered:
( ) ( ) ( )it i it it it
MR O    RW
5.107 6.361 13.108
0.004 0.181 CR4 0.111 log ,
-
= a - + +
where αi is the sector-specific term and t-ratios are given in parentheses. Thus, for
the whole sample, the overall coefficient of openness is estimated to be a mere –
0.004. The magnitude, which is found to be statistically significant at the 1 percent
level, is nevertheless very small, suggesting that the sixteen years of adjustment to
foreign integration has not brought a meaningful change in the market structure of
the Turkish manufacturing industry. As such, the speed of adjustment of gross
profit margins is revealed to be very slow in spite of the import discipline or export
penetration, and the technological and institutional barriers to entry seem to per-
sist over the post-1980 reform era.
Concentration rates, on the other hand, have a statistically significant and higher
(positive) coefficient with 0.181 at the 1 percent level. Thus, a 1 percent increase in
the level of concentration as measured through the CR4 ratio is likely to affect the
average profit margin of the sector by +0.18 percent. The a priori theoretical expec-
tation that higher concentration levels would be indicative of higher profit margins
is confirmed in the aggregate. What is more interesting, however, is that markups
do have a positive relationship with respect to real wage costs, with 0.111. These
observations suggest that the sector has been characterized by Sraffian dynamics in
the aggregate, with persistence of markups against wage increases. (See also Boratav
et al. 2000, and Yentürk and Onaran 1999, for a further assessment of the behavior
of markups against the post-1989 wage cycle in Turkish private manufacturing.)
Across the subgroups, we observe that, in general, “open” sectors (as of 1980)
have a negative relationship with “openness.” “Inward-looking” (as of 1980) sec-
tors, on the other hand, display a positive relationship against the same variable.
Most important, “trade adjusters” carry a coefficient of +0.026 vis-à-vis openness.
Thus, for those sectors that were inward-looking by 1980, the process of opening
could not have been associated with a competitive discipline squeezing the cost
margins (markups). On the contrary, there seems to be evidence that the inward-
looking sectors (as of 1980) adjusted the new trade environment by way of in-
creasing their profit margins (with an estimated coefficient of +0.026 vis-à-vis
openness). Trade adjusters, as a group, displayed positive coefficients in relation
with the concentration indicator (CR4) and the real wage costs. Except for the
“inward-looking and imperfectly competitive” group, markups have a positive
relationship with real wage costs under all groups. Thus, generally speaking, it
seems that the manufacturing sectors could have responded to the shocks of trade
policy and the real wage costs by increasing their profit margins over the post-
1980 reform era.
At a finer level of detail of the ISIC three-digit classification, individual branches
display much variation. Overall, among the statistically significant results, markups
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respond negatively to openness in seven subsectors, and positively in seven
subsectors. The sector that has the highest negative coefficient is the beverage in-
dustry (313). Petroleum industries (353) and nonmetals (369) also have signifi-
cantly high negative coefficients. Sector 353, however, is a pure public monopoly,
and its pricing behavior is likely to be attributable to mostly political factors.
On the other end of the spectrum, in the equations of important intermediate
goods producers, such as chemicals (352), plastics (354), and electrical machinery
(383), openness has relatively high positive responses on profit margins with +0.256,
+0.097, and +0.0031, respectively. Within the “trade adjusters,” only food manu-
facturing (321) and iron and steel (371) display statistically significant, negative,
coefficients vis-à-vis openness.
When we analyze the sectoral effects of concentration and real wage move-
ments against the markups, we witness higher responsiveness coefficients. The







Except for chemicals, all of these sectors disclose positive coefficients of real
wage costs on markups as well. In fact, counting only the statistically significant
results, of the eleven sectors that had positive relationship between markups and
the concentration levels, seven carry positive responsiveness vis-à-vis real wage
costs. These findings provide supporting evidence confirming the hypothesis that
increased real wage costs could have been translated into higher markups via power
of market concentration. The sectors that revealed the highest positive relation-






In summary, our econometric results reflect a pattern of sluggishness of the
existing levels of concentration and markup-induced noncompetitive pricing in
Turkish manufacturing against a sixteen-year period of trade liberalization adjust-
ments. With a relatively small rate of change of markup rates (averaging –0.004
for the whole period), the sector seems to display a resistance to increased compe-
tition despite the import discipline the post-1980 adjustments have brought. It is
also notable that the sectors that are characterized by high concentration coeffi-
cients do not necessarily reflect high shares of public ownership and that reduc-
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tions in the share of the public companies in the sector do not lead directly to an
increase in the degree of competitiveness. In this respect, comparing the data for
1980 and 1996, one can see that there are sectors in which concentration rates
(CR4) have declined parallel to a decrease in the share of the public sector (iron
and steel [371], beverages [313], paper and paper products [341]), whereas there
have also been sectors (chemicals [351], tobacco [314]) in which monopolization
increased as a result of the same process. These observations reveal that, contrary
to expectations of the orthodox theory, the process of trade liberalization has, in
general, been insufficient to introduce the expected increase in competition in the
industrial commodity markets. This verdict brings us to issues of distribution and
pricing.
Investment Behavior and Patterns of Accumulation
Now we turn our attention to the analysis of the behavior of sectoral investment in
response to openness, markup rates (profitability), and real wage costs by regress-
ing the logarithm of sectoral real investments against CR4, MR, and the logarithm
of RW (Equation (2′ )). Results are tabulated in Tables 5 and 6.
The overall effect of profit margins on manufacturing real investment is quite
strong with an elasticity of 0.548. This suggests the presence of strong accelera-
tionist investment patterns in the sector. Openness is not found to be statistically
significant.
The estimated equation has been found to be
( ) ( ) ( )it it it it
 RI  MR  O   RWi
5.956 1.439 15.063
Log 0.548 0.035 0.841 Log .= a + + +
The most interesting result is the estimated positive elasticity of real wages on
real investment with a coefficient of +0.841, which is statistically significant at the
1 percent level. In other words, real wages seem to act as an accelerationist vari-
able, stimulating real fixed investments in the manufacturing sector, whereas the
effect of openness—as measured in ratios of trade volume to value added—has
been found to be insignificant. The unorthodox behavior of real wages in stimulat-
ing both gross profit margins and real investments in a positive manner suggests
the continued importance of domestic demand factors in the Turkish industrial
commodity markets. These results concur with the findings of Yentürk and Onaran
(1999) in their classification of the post-1980 Turkish manufacturing as following
a wage-led growth pattern.
Sectoral responses of investment to markups have generally very high coeffi-
cients. Sectors such as transport equipment (384), textiles (321), professional equip-
ment goods (385), and printing (341) have coefficients exceeding 2.0. It is
interesting to observe that across the above-identified sectors, only textiles (321)
carry a statistically significant relationship of the effect of trade openness. Further-






























Relationship Between Real Investment, Markup Rates, Openness, and Real Wage Costs
Markup Real wage
rates Openness costs Adjusted R2 F-statistic DW test
Overall effect 0.549* 0.035 0.841* 0.979 10666.1* 0.88
Open and competitive 1.975* 0.016 0.934* 0.963 863.83* 1.11
Open and imperfectly
  competitive 0.207 0.004 0.700* 0.983 2951.8* 0.95
Inward looking and
  competitive 0.456* 0.297* 0.917* 0.992 7646.20* 0.796
Inward looking and
  imperfectly competitive 0.428* 0.249* 0.661* 0.907 934.75* 1.23
Trade adjusting 0.433* 0.271* 0.806* 0.991 3778.63 1.12
Note: * is statistically significant at 1 percent.
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Table 6
Relationship Between Real Investment, Markup Rates, Openness, and Real
Wage Costs (FEM with cross-section specific effects)
Cross-section Markup Real wage
effects rates Openness costs
311 0.096 0.451* 0.948*
312 0.991 0.379* 0.476
313 1.081* 3.106* 2.244*
314 0.602* 0.949* 2.222*
321 2.180* 0.445* 0.054
322 10.847 0.134 3.153
323 – 0.894 0.336* – 0.245
324 1.778* 0.194* 0.618*
331 1.446* 0.154 1.666*
332 0.556 0.163 0.509
341 2.188* 0.147 – 0.189
342 0.218 – 2.164* – 0.615**
351 – 0.129 – 0.095 0.089
352 – 0.157 0.578* 1.311*
353 0.565 – 0.294 – 0.674
354 0.090 – 0.097 0.806*
355 0.460 0.636 0.625
356 0.492 0.863* 1.204*
361 1.016* 1.848* 0.607*
362 1.137 1.325 0.715
369 1.230 – 0.160 – 0.227
371 1.464 0.325 0.540
372 0.253 – 0.081* – 0.267*
381 1.662 – 0.540 1.205*
382 – 0.096 0.152* 0.687*
383 – 0.489 0.547* 0.921*
384 3.159* 0.042 0.872*
385 2.459 0.029 2.580*




Notes: * is statistically significant at 1 percent; ** is significant at 5 percent.
98 EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE
negative elasticities of investment with respect to real wages, with –0.615 and –0.267,
respectively. The highest effect of real wages on investment is found in beverages
(313), with +2.244. This is followed by tobacco manufacturing (314), with +2.222;
wood products (331), with 1.666; and other chemicals (352), with 1.311.
Concluding Comments
In this paper, we investigated the structural consequences of the post-1980 out-
ward-orientation on the market concentration, pricing behavior, and accumulation
patterns in Turkish manufacturing industries. Utilizing existing evidence on the extent
of monopolization and high concentration in the Turkish manufacturing industries,
we attempted to formalize on these observations to deduce econometric hypotheses
on the patterns of trade liberalization, accumulation, and profitability. To this end,
we investigated our empirical questions using various panel data procedures over
twenty-nine subsectors of Turkish manufacturing for the 1980–1996 period.
Existing data reveal very little structural change in the sectoral composition
and nature of market concentration and behavior of profit margins under the post-
1980 Turkish structural adjustment reforms and outward-orientation. It is also
notable that the sectors that are characterized by high concentration coefficients
do not necessarily reflect high shares of public ownership, and that reductions in
the share of the public companies do not lead directly to an increase in the degree
of competitiveness. As such, the speed of adjustment of concentration is revealed
to be very slow in spite of the import discipline or export penetration, and the
technological and institutional barriers to entry seem to persist over the post-1980
reform era.
We found that “openness” had very little impact, if any, on the levels of profit
margins (markups) and also on the behavior of sectoral investments. Our econo-
metric results reflect a pattern of sluggishness of the existing levels of markups in
Turkish manufacturing against a sixteen-year period of trade liberalization adjust-
ments. With a relatively small effect of “openness” on gross profit margins (aver-
aging –0.004 for the whole period), the sector seems to display a resistance to
increased competition despite the import discipline the post-1980 adjustments have
brought. In fact, those “trade adjusting” sectors that were classified as “inward-
looking” in 1980, and became “open” by 1996, display a positive response (+0.026)
of profit margins vis-à-vis openness. Thus, our results suggest that, contrary to the
prognostications of the orthodox theory, the post-1980 export orientation of Turk-
ish manufacturing could not lend itself into gains in competitiveness and could not
be sustained as a viable strategy of “export-led industrialization” via increased
investments. As well, producers’ expectations regarding the credibility of the lib-
eralization program and time-consistency of the policies are among the relevant
discussion subjects.
Profit margins (markups) are further found to be positively and significantly
affected from concentration power and real wage cost increases. Thus, there seems
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to be evidence that the manufacturing sectors have responded to shocks of trade
policy and real wage costs by increasing their indigenous profit margins. Real
investments, in turn, have been found to have a statistically insignificant relation-
ship with “openness”; yet, significant and positive responses to profit margins and
real wages. This finding suggests the continued importance of the domestic de-
mand factors in the Turkish industrial commodity markets and an overall wage-
led growth pattern with both profit margins and real wages acting as accelerationist
variables to stimulate fixed investments.
Notes
1. See, for instance, Boratav et al. (2000), Bulutay (1995), Ercan (1999), Filiztekin
(1999), Kepenek (1996), Köse and Yeldan (1998a, 1998b), Maras*léog¬lu and Tékték (1991),
Metin-Ozcan et al. (1999), Onaran (2000), Pamukçu and de Boer (1999), S *enses (1996),
Uygur (1996), Yeldan (1995), and Yentürk (1997, 1999).
2. See, for instance, Günes * (1991), Katércéog ¬lu (1990), Kaytaz et al. (1993), and
S *ahinkaya (1993) for the evaluation of market concentration and patterns of oligopolistic
markup pricing in the industrial commodity markets. Günes* et al. (1996), in turn, document
comprehensive panel data on the degree of concentration in Turkish manufacturing using
the standard input–output classification for the 1985–1993 period.
3. This is the threshold used by Boratav et al. (2000) and Yeldan and Köse (1999),
where, on a further level of finesse, the sectors that had CR4 ratios between 30 percent and
49 percent are classified as “monopolistically competitive,” and the sectors with CR4 ratios
exceeding 50 percent are regarded to be “oligopolistic.”
4. See Boratav and Türel (1993), Celasun (1994), Celasun and Rodrik (1989), S *enses
(1994), and Uygur (1993) for a thorough overview of the post-1980 Turkish structural
adjustment reforms. For a quantitative assessment of the export-subsidization program, see
Milanovic (1986) and Togan (1993).
5. See Balkan and Yeldan (1998), Boratav et al. (1996), Ekinci (1998), Özatay (1999),
Selçuk (1997), and Yentürk (1999) for an extensive discussion of the post-financial liberal-
ization macroeconomic adjustments in Turkey.
6. Given that the idea of “seller concentration” refers to the size distribution of firms
that sell a particular product, the concept is usually regarded as a significant dimension of
market structure since it is thought to play an important part in determining market power.
Some researchers who have been studying market power have sought to measure it by
using indices based on microeconomic theory dating back to Lerner (1934), who suggested
that the difference between price and marginal cost divided by price could serve as a direct
measure of departures from the competitive ideal. Despite its intuitive appeal, the Lerner
index is criticized on the grounds that it is essentially an ex post measure of allocative
efficiency. Curry and George (1983) provide a thorough evaluation of these issues.
7. For more detailed information on these and related concepts, see the SIS Manufac-
turing Annual Industry Surveys and the SIS Web site at www.die.gov.tr.
8. We estimated three specifications, one with
MRit = α + β1Oit + β2CR4it + β3 Log RWit + β4D1 + β5D2 + β6D1Oit + β7D2Oit,
where D1 is a dummy for open sectors taking a value of one and inward-looking sectors
taking a value of zero. D2 is a dummy for competitive sectors taking a value of one and
imperfectly competitive ones taking a value of zero. D1Oit and D2Oit are respective interaction
dummies with the openness. α, β1, β2, and β3, are common intercept and slope coefficients,
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respectively. This specification is estimated using pooled least squares for all sectors. The
second one is an unrestricted form of the former specification written as
MRit = αit + β1Oit + β2CR4it + β3 Log RWit + β4D1Oit + β5D2Oit,
and estimated as a fixed-effect model, where αit is estimated as the intercept term of each
respective sector.
Using an F-test, we tested the null hypothesis of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)
against the alternative of an FEM. The F-test favors FEM (F = 26.8 F26, 455 = 1.70 at α =
0.01). The same equation is estimated using REM and specified as
MRit = α + αit + β1Oit + β2CR4it + β3 Log RWit + β4D1Oit + β5D2Oit,
where α is a common intercept and αit is considered an intercept in the REM, namely
residuals. The null here is REM, and the alternative is FEM. Using an F-test, we reject the
null (F = 2.03 and F28,455 = 1.46 at α = 0.05). This type of testing was also performed in
considering Equation (2′ ) and the results consistently favor FEM. The Hausman χ2 test also
concludes that a contemporaneous correlation between the residuals and the explanatory
variables does exist for Equations (1′ ) and (2′ ), where each test statistic is found to be
greater than χ2(1) = 3.84 at a 5 percent significance level. Estimation results are not provided
here, but can be requested from the authors.
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Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities
Manufacturing Industry Classification
311 Food manufacturing
312 Manufacture of food products not elsewhere classified
313 Beverage industries
314 Tobacco manufactures
321 Manufacture of textiles
322 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear
323 Manufacture of leather and products of leather, leather substitutes, and
fur, except footwear and wearing apparel
324 Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanize or molded rubber or plastic
footwear
331 Manufacture of wood and wood cork products, except furniture
332 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal
341 Manufacture of paper and paper products
342 Printing, publishing, and allied industries
351 Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals
352 Manufacture of other chemical products
353 Petroleum refineries
354 Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal
355 Manufacture of rubber products
356 Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere classified
361 Manufacture of pottery, china, and earthenware
362 Manufacture of manufacture of glass and glass products
369 Manufacture of other nonmetallic mineral products
371 Iron and steel basic industries
372 Nonferrous metal basic industries
381 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and
equipment
382 Manufacture of machinery (except electrical)
383 Manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus, repairing, appliances,
and supplies
384 Manufacture of transport equipment
385 Manufacture of professional, scientific measuring, and photographic
and optical goods
390 Other manufacturing industries
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